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Abstract: Pulse shape discriminating scintillator materials in many cases allow the user to identify two 
basic kinds of pulses arising from two kinds of particles: neutrons and gammas. An uncomplicated solution 
for building a classifier consists of a two-component mixture model learned from a collection of pulses 
from neutrons and gammas at a range of energies. Depending on the conditions of data gathered to be 
classified, multiple classes of events besides neutrons and gammas may occur, most notably pileup events. 
All these kinds of events are anomalous and, in cases where the class of the particle is in doubt, it is 
preferable to remove them from the analysis. This study compares the performance of several machine 
learning and analytical methods for using the scores from the two-component model to identify anomalous 
events and in particular to remove pileup events. A specific outcome of this study is to propose a novel 
anomaly score, denoted G, from an unsupervised two-component model that is conveniently distributed on 
the interval [-1,1]. 
Keywords: Scintillators, Neutron detection, Pulse shape discrimination, Digital PSD, Bayes classifier, Pile-
up, Pile-up rejection, Anomaly rejection 
 
1. Introduction 
This work describes a method to reject anomalies using the 
scores based on likelihoods provided by an unsupervised two-
component statistical model trained with data consisting 
almost entirely of two classes of digitized pulses. In this case, 
the statistical model is a Gaussian Mixture Model (GMM), the 
training data are low-count-rate (low pileup) Cf-252 pulses, 
and the components and scores correspond to neutrons and 
gammas. The anomalies of primary interest are pileup pulses, 
with the specific concern of pileup gammas that would be 
misclassified as neutrons. For this study, we treat the neutrons 
as the specific desirable class, and ignore distinctions within 
the leftover class.  
2. Pulse Shapes 
2.1 Neutrons and gammas 
In conventional PSD materials, fast neutrons interact with 
protons which recoil in the material and ionize molecules 
densely along a short path, while gammas interact with 
electrons which recoil in the material and ionize molecules 
sparsely along a longer path. Owing to density-dependent de-
excitation processes, the de-excitation times are different for 
the two kinds of particles, and the neutron scintillation pulses 
are broader in time than the gamma pulses [1,2,3,4].  
As observed by electronics sensitive to approximately ten 
nanoseconds, a scintillation pulse for both kinds of particles 
has a fast and a slow component that each decay in time. The 
neutron pulse is broader than a gamma pulse because the 
proportion of the slowly-decaying component to the faster 
component is greater for a neutron. Careful pulse-by-pulse 
shape analysis can discriminate between these two kinds of 
pulses, and many pulse classification methods have been 
proposed and implemented, using analog [1] and digital [5] 
electronics. 
2.2 The shapes of pileups 
If two particles interact nearly simultaneously in the 
scintillating volume, then their scintillation pulses overlap in 
time. Such overlapping pulses, called “pileups”, confuse the 
discrimination between neutrons and gammas. A second small 
pulse, delayed a little bit from a preceding gamma pulse, 
causes the sum of the two pulses to be apparently broadened 
and look more like a single pulse from a neutron. The result is 
that, in conditions of high event rate, the probability of a 
gamma pulse being broadened increases and thus the rate of 
gamma pulses misidentified as neutrons will increase.	
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3. PSD Methods 
For fast neutron detection, the most basic pulse discrimination 
case consists of distinguishing a single pulse from the absence 
of a pulse, the more particular case consists of discriminating 
neutron pulses from gammas, and the most subtle case 
involves discriminating anomalous pulses from neutrons and 
gammas. For the first case, solutions used by the authors rely 
on trigger algorithms implemented in commercially-available 
digital pulse processing hardware and firmware [6]. The 
authors covered the second case in a recent series of papers 
[7,8,9,10,11]. This paper discusses the third case: trigger-
collected pulses which exhibit shapes unlike those from either 
neutrons or gammas. 
Any kind of pulse classification relies on a universal principle: 
one kind of pulse is known to exhibit one kind of shape, other 
kinds are known to exhibit other kinds of shapes. The shapes 
are quantified using data collected under known conditions, 
commonly called “training data”. A digitized waveform is pre-
processed and compared against these quantified shapes 
(possibly including variance), and a comparison parameter is 
obtained for the waveform for each kind of known shape. The 
waveform’s comparison parameters are then combined into a 
score or set of scores, and those scores are used to discriminate 
between neutrons, gammas, and anomalies. The methods of 
pre-processing, comparison, and discrimination form a large 
menagerie of approaches proposed and implemented over the 
years [5]. 
3.1 GMM for non-pileup gamma-neutron 
In previous papers [7,8,10], working under a practical 
constraint to use only unsupervised methods, the authors 
showed that a two-component GMM is a straightforward and 
effective method of relying on unlabeled training data 
consisting of neutrons and gammas to obtain a score to 
discriminate neutrons from gammas. GMM finds clusters in 
the multivariate space of observed features of the training data 
that contains both neutrons and gammas. If the neutrons and 
gammas are sufficiently well-separated in feature space, then 
neutrons and gammas are the two components found by the 
GMM. To classify a new event, the GMM provides two scores 
describing consistency with each of the components, and the 
two scores can be combined into a final single score to 
discriminate between neutrons and gammas. 
The component scores can be expressed a number of different 
ways. Each Gaussian component j is assigned a mean vector 𝝁! and a covariance matrix Sj. Then, for any measured pulse, 
variance-normalized distances — called Mahalanobis 
distances Dj [12] — can be obtained between the pulse’s 
feature vector z and the means of each of the fitted Gaussians: 𝐷!(𝒛) = 𝐷(𝒛; 𝜃!+ = ,(𝒛 −	𝝁!)′𝚺!"#(𝒛 −	𝝁!) 
where qj = (µj,Sj). The Mahalanobis distance appears in the 
likelihood function f for each cluster j: 
 
𝑓!(𝒛) = 𝑓(𝒛1𝜃!+ = 1,(2𝜋)$|𝚺!| exp	(−#%𝐷!%(𝒛)) (1) 
where d is the number of dimensions of the feature space. And 
the two likelihoods appear in the expression (likelihood ratio) 
of the likelihood that an observed event z is consistent with a 
model of the neutron pulse shape, 
 𝑃&(𝒛) = 𝑃(𝑐𝑙𝑎𝑠𝑠 = 𝑛|𝒛; 𝜃&, 𝜃' , 𝛼&, 𝛼')= 	 𝛼&𝑓&(𝒛)𝛼&𝑓&(𝒛) + 𝛼'𝑓'(𝒛) (2) 
where n and g denote neutrons and gammas, and the alphas are 
mixing coefficients from the expected proportions of neutrons 
and gammas. It is important that the set of training data be 
collected, inspected, and cleaned such that contamination from 
anomalous pulses or other phenomena is very low, so that only 
the two clusters corresponding to neutrons and gammas are 
present. There are several options for processing of the pulse 
data and GMM structure that may affect performance. 
Carefully quantified performance metrics guide the user to 
choose among these options. The authors selected a specific 
method of pre-processing the feature vectors that yielded the 
best neutron-gamma discrimination results for the data-
collection setup described in Section 4.1 when scored using 
labeled data and evaluated with a ROC curve [7]. The user is 
also free to choose the most appropriate covariance structure 
for the GMM, and the authors selected a shared covariance 
matrix (same covariance matrix across the two components), 
and used only the diagonal entries (variances) to compute the 
Mahalanobis distance [8], as follows:	 
𝐷!(𝒛) = BC(𝑧( −	𝜇!!+%𝜎!!!(  
where 𝜎!!! are the diagonal elements of Sj. Depending on the 
completeness of the statistical model, a few different measures 
of similarity to a given condition are available. As described 
above, the probability of a pulse belonging to either of the 
components can be computed from the two means and 
covariances and two mixing coefficients, while the likelihoods 
in Equation (1) are computed from only the means and 
covariances. 
Even when there is insufficient knowledge to compute 
probability, the likelihoods can be used to discriminate 
between the two classes. The optimal binary test between 
gammas and neutrons, in the Neyman–Pearson sense [13], is a 
likelihood ratio test between neutron and gamma pulse 
distributions. The log-likelihood ratio (LLR) is the difference 
of the two log-likelihoods, with a single log-likelihood: ln	(𝑓!(𝒛)) = −#%𝐷!%(𝒛) + 𝐾! 
where 
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𝐾! = ln	⎝⎛ 1,(2𝜋)$|𝚺!|⎠⎞ 
And the log-likelihood ratio is: 𝐿𝐿𝑅(𝒛) = ln P𝑓&(𝒛) 𝑓'(𝒛)Q R =	−#%𝐷&%(𝒛) + 𝐾& − (−#%𝐷'%(𝒛) + 𝐾') = −#%(𝐷&%(𝒛)−𝐷'%(𝒛)) + 𝐾& −𝐾' 
And so, because we selected a shared covariance matrix Kn = 
Kg for the covariance structure: 𝐿𝐿𝑅(𝒛) = 	 #%(𝐷'%(𝒛)−𝐷&%(𝒛)) 
Note that it is necessary to choose the numerator and 
denominator of the ratio in the LLR. The authors prefer to 
make LLR for the neutrons positive. If the vector of pulse 
samples z were exactly the mean neutron pulse, 𝒛 = 𝜇&, then 𝐷&%(𝒛 = 𝝁&) = 0, and since µn ¹ µg then 𝐷'%(𝒛 = 𝝁&) > 0, 
making LLR(µn) > 0, so we define the LLR as log of neutron 
likelihood over gamma likelihood. 
We define one last pair of scores: 𝑆'(𝒛) = 	"	#%𝐷'%(𝒛), 𝑆&(𝒛) = −	#%𝐷&%(𝒛) 
Note that 𝐿𝐿𝑅(𝒛) = 𝑆&(𝒛) − 𝑆'(𝒛). In later sections, the two 
S-scores will be used to score anomalies. 
Labeled data can be used to optimize performance ([11] 
describes a method of labeling PSD neutrons and gammas). 
With labeled data, the user compares the likelihood ratio to a 
threshold that is tuned to give a desired false positive rate 
(FPR). In the absence of labeled data, the performance can be 
tuned using probabilities estimated from the assumption that 
the fitted Gaussians correctly model the training data, 
otherwise, the FPR and related measures like true positive rate 
(TPR) are more important quantities than probabilities based 
on an idealized model, as in Equation (2). 
3.2 GMM and anomaly rejection 
All Users of PSD-based detector systems encounter problems 
trying to classify events that are neither neutrons nor gammas, 
called anomalies. Of special concern is that, in high flux 
environments, anomalies are dominated by pileups, which in 
turn are dominated by piled up gamma events. Finally, the 
pileups, especially in organic scintillators, preferentially 
contaminate the events classified as neutrons. 
The main problem with pileups is that, unlike neutrons and 
gammas, they are not characterized by a consistent set of 
shapes. Instead of simply being one of two kinds of broader or 
narrower pulses, pileups are liable to have bumps and 
shoulders anywhere along the leading edge or tail of the pulse. 
This means that the anomaly problem is less about matching a 
definable type than to reject events that are different from 
known classes. 
This work reports on the effectiveness of methods using a 
GMM trained only on neutrons and gammas to reject 
anomalous pulses from pulses classified as neutrons. Judging 
effectiveness requires tests with known pulse types. 
Assembling a collection of known pileup pulse types takes 
some effort because, unlike gamma and neutron pulses, real 
experimental pileups are very hard to label properly. 
3.2.1 Splitting neutrons from gammas 
Our foremost concern is with the anomalies that are mis-
classified as neutrons. We will limit the remaining discussion 
to those that have been classified by the original GMM as 
neutrons, and describe and test methods to separate the pileups 
from the neutrons. To restrict the investigation to events that 
would be classified as neutrons, we make a first cut using the 
optimal properties of LLR, as noted above. We set the 
threshold for neutrons at LLR = 0. This is the point where the 
likelihoods of a pulse being a neutron or a gamma are equal, 
as determined by the GMM. Among the remaining events with 
LLR > 0, we will compare the behaviour of cuts between the 
neutrons and pileups. The three-step method of finding a pulse, 
accepting neutrons, and rejecting anomalies is shown in  
Figure 1. 
 
Figure 1. Flow chart for finding and classifying electronic 
pulses read out of gamma-neutron PSD materials. 
3.2.2 Recruiting gamma-neutron GMM scores to make cuts 
between neutrons and anomalies 
Even as the machine learning field is continually making 
advances, judgement and deliberation are required to select an 
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anomaly rejection approach suited to a specific task (see, e.g. 
[16]). 
In the situation at hand, the GMM provides two scores. In the 
space of the two scores, we can plot training data (described in 
Section 4) containing the three kinds of events – neutrons, 
gammas, and pile-ups—, visually look for boundaries that 
separate them, and look for ways to draw those boundaries in 
a simple way. The left panel of Figure 2 shows LLR versus 
energy for Cf-252, Cs-137, and synthetic pileup. It seems clear 
that LLR and energy do not provide a means to separate pileup 
events from neutrons and gammas. Because we constrained 
our practical application to work only with unlabeled data, we 
limit our options to prefer either cuts on statistically rigorous 
parameters or, failing that, straight cuts in a space that is easy 
to compute from the mixture model {qn, qγ}. 
 
Figure 2. Cf-252 data (red points) combined with Cs-137 data 
(black points), including synthetic pileup in the amount 
expected to represent 100kHz of Cs-137 interactions. Top, the 
LLR score provides little ability to reject pileup. Center, the G 
score provides clearly improved pileup rejection, and gamma 
contamination of the neutron band drops drastically for G 
greater than ~0.25. Bottom, a cut on SumL drastically reduces 
pileup counts, but many with the most neutron-like scores 
remain. Full-color version available on-line. 
 
3.2.3 Sum of likelihoods 
The most straightforward and statistically rigorous test for an 
anomaly using the likelihoods provided by a two-component 
GMM is to sum the likelihoods. The derivation is as follows. 
That the observed event z is an anomaly or not depends on the 
posterior probability of belonging to class neutron or class 
gamma given z, 𝑃(𝑐𝑙𝑎𝑠𝑠 = 𝑛 ∪ 𝛾|𝒛). The smaller this 
probability, the more likely z is an anomaly. It can be rewritten 
as being proportional to the sum of the two likelihoods under 
neutron and gamma, respectively. 𝑃(𝑐𝑙𝑎𝑠𝑠 = 𝑛 ∪ 𝛾|𝒛) = 𝑃(𝑐𝑙𝑎𝑠𝑠 = 𝑛|𝒛) + 𝑃(𝑐𝑙𝑎𝑠𝑠 = 𝛾|𝒛)																																							∝ 𝑃(𝑐𝑙𝑎𝑠𝑠 = 𝑛, 𝒛) + 𝑃(𝑐𝑙𝑎𝑠𝑠 = 𝛾, 𝒛)																																							= 𝑃(𝒛|𝑐𝑙𝑎𝑠𝑠 = 𝑛)𝑃(𝑐𝑙𝑎𝑠𝑠 = 𝑛)+ 𝑃(𝒛|𝑐𝑙𝑎𝑠𝑠 = 𝛾)𝑃(𝑐𝑙𝑎𝑠𝑠 = 𝛾)																																							= 𝛼&𝑓&(𝒛) + 𝛼'𝑓'(𝒛) 
(In this notation, P( A|B , C ) means “the probability of A given 
B and C”). Note that in the special case when 𝛼& = 𝛼', the 
above posterior probability is proportional to the sum of the 
likelihoods. The likelihood of observing z given a class, and 
the prior on the class probabilities, are estimated from the 
training data set. This technique is known as Bayesian network 
based semi-supervised anomaly detection [14]. 
In practice, the sum of likelihoods can be difficult to compute 
because the likelihoods are the constant e to a large negative 
number. In order to make a practical computation of the log of 
the sum of the likelihoods, the exact expression, where Kn = 
Kg = Kshared, is: ln(𝑓&(𝒛) + 𝑓'(𝒛)+= ln(exp(𝑆&(𝒛)) + exp(𝑆'(𝒛))+ + 𝐾*+,-.$	 
leading to ln(exp(𝑆&) + exp(𝑆')+= 	−#%min(𝑆&, 𝑆'+ + ln	(1 + exp	(−1𝑆& − 𝑆'1) 
In the region of neutron events provided by the LLR = 0 cut, 
the log sum of likelihoods is almost a straight cut using only 
the Sn score. 
3.2.4 Convenient expression of ratio of log-likelihoods 
This work also proposes another parameter based on the 
likelihoods. We call this parameter G, and it is formed by 
dividing the negative of the sum of the S-scores out of the LLR 
for z (the negative sum of S-scores makes G positive when 
LLR is positive, and negative when LLR is negative). As noted 
above, Kn = Kg in our choice of covariance structures, so G is: 𝐺(𝒛) = 	𝑆'(𝒛) − 𝑆&(𝒛)𝑆&(𝒛) + 𝑆'(𝒛) 
Cuts in this parameter are the same as those along the 
parameter that is the ratio of S-scores. Although G is a simple 
transformation of the ratio of the S-scores, 
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𝐺 = 1 −	 21 +	𝑆'𝑆& 
it has two particularly convenient properties: 1) G = 0 at LLR 
= 0 and 2) G is more well-behaved than the ratio of scores, 
running from -1 to 1 instead of 0 to infinity. The properties of 
G with shared covariance are such that a pulse at the mean of 
the neutron Gaussian component will have G of 1, at the mean 
of the gamma will have a G of -1, and anomalies will have G 
near zero. In a non-rigorous application, a plot of G versus 
energy allows the user to set by-eye cuts to suppress anomalies 
or as guided quantitatively by synthetic pileup discussed in 
Section 4.2. Figure 2 shows the qualitative comparison of 
separating events of different types using LLR, G, and G with 
a cut on sum of likelihoods. Sections 4.4 and 4.5 describe how 
to use synthetic pileups to guide the cuts quantitatively.  
4. Tests 
When labeled data is available, performance of several 
approaches can be compared using trade curves. In the present 
investigation, lab-acquired labeled pileups are hard to come 
by, instead we synthesize sets of some expected cases of 
pileups and use them to evaluate the performance of methods 
that use the scores from the GMM. Because this investigation 
occurs only in the region of S scores cut by LLR to favor 
neutrons, the neutron test set is also labeled in an informal 
manner. The neutron datasets for training and test will be all 
events from our low-rate Cf-252 data with GMM-derived  
LLR > 0. 
Performance comparisons will be made using the trade curves 
known as ROC curves. ROC curves show the tradeoff between 
properly classifying neutrons as neutrons, and misclassifying 
pileups as neutrons. We will also compare performance using 
precision-recall (P-R) curves, a trade curve that takes the 
relative rates of neutrons and pileups into account to determine 
the fraction of events classified as neutrons that really are 
neutrons. P-R is important in situations where the ratio of all 
pileups to all neutrons is high even if the fraction of pileups 
misclassified as neutrons is low.  
In the GMM score space, the neutrons have a large overlap 
with anomalies. In order to show the limitation imposed by this 
challenging situation, we will compare the performance of our 
feasible approaches against methods that are outside the 
constraints imposed by our application, namely we will obtain 
performance curves for a few conventional supervised 
methods. These supervised methods should outperform the 
unsupervised methods and benchmark the limitations of 
working with data with a large overlap. Computationally 
simple metrics that are easily compatible with FPGA 
implementation are of particular interest. 
Tests with ROC curves and supervised training can only be 
performed when one has well-labeled data, where the instances 
are strictly of one class or the other. The synthetic pileups are 
strictly pileup data, although subject to any mismatch between 
synthesized and true pileup events. The LLR > 0 Cf-252 data 
is not strictly fast neutrons, it has a small amount of 
contamination from gamma events. For ROC curves, 
contamination in the “positives”, which in this case are 
neutrons, means that the true positive rate will be artificially 
low especially near the transition between low-TPR/low-FPR 
and high-TPR/high-FPR. To determine the approximate size 
of the effect of gammas contaminating the Cf-252 neutrons 
used as ground truth, we made the following estimate. For pure 
Cs-137 gammas, we built the LLR distribution with binwidth 
of 1. The ratio of counts in the peak bin to number of Cs-137 
events with LLR > 0 is about 2.6. For the gamma-and-neutron 
Cf-252 source, we also built the LLR distribution with 
binwidth of 1. The Cf-252 distribution has two peaks, and the 
peak below LLR = 0 contains mostly gammas. If the LLR < 0 
gamma peak is in the same ratio to LLR > 0 gammas for both 
Cf-252 and Cs-137, then we can estimate the number of 
gammas contaminating the LLR > 0 Cf-252 events and 
compare that number with the total number of LLR > 0 Cf-252 
events. The ratio is 1:200, meaning that we estimate no more 
than 1/200 events used for obtaining the TPR is actually a 
contaminating gamma event. Bear in mind that this small 
effect will reduce the apparent TPR for a given FPR for all the 
ROC curves approximately the same and so will have very 
little influence on the comparison among ROC curves. 
4.1 Experimental set up and training the GMM 
The experimental setup consisted of a 4-inch diameter 3-inch 
long EJ-309 cell read-out by a Hamamatsu R6233 PMT into a 
Struck 3316 digitizer card running at 250 Msamples/sec and 
collecting pulses in a 256-sample window with a 40-sample 
pre-trigger. To do the pulse processing, the 256 samples are 
split into an 8-sample pre-trigger baseline and a 128-sample 
pulse window. The trigger threshold corresponded to 
approximately a 10 keV electron. 
We collected two datasets: Cf-252 at 692 events per second 
and Cs-137 at 30,442 events per second. The Cs-137 dataset 
was used for single-point energy calibration. The Cf-252 
dataset consists almost entirely of non-anomaly neutron events 
and gamma events. This dataset was split into two unequal 
parts. The first 2000 events were used to train the two-
component GMM. Only pulses of approximately 80 to 3000 
keVee, the range near the synthetic trigger threshold discussed 
below to the highest energy non-saturated events, were used in 
the training. The rest of the Cf-252 data is used to provide 
neutron events for testing, with a LLR > 0 and energy > 100 
keVee cut to remove nearly all the gammas. The Cs-137 
dataset, consisting almost entirely of gamma events and piled 
up gamma events, is used to synthesize piled-up gamma 
events. Figure 3 shows the rate of contamination of non-
neutron events from the LLR > 0 cut.  
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Figure 3. The LLR distributions for low rate Cs-137 (red) and 
Cf-252 (black) data. The Cf distribution is scaled down to 
approximate a 1:1000 neutron signal to gamma background. 
For the most basic purity cuts, pileup background is expected 
to dominate over misidentification of single pulses, 
represented by the smooth distribution. The excellent 
approximation of the Cs LLR distribution by a Gaussian for 
LLR > -100, as shown by the red curve, indicates that pileup 
is likely to be the dominant background for even a 1:10000 
neutron signal to gamma background for tight cuts in G that 
cause ~50% efficiency loss, as shown by the green curve. Full-
color version available on-line. 
4.2 Synthesizing pileup events 
In order to train and/or test with labeled pileups, we rely on 
synthesizing piled-up gamma pulses. A data set of 662 keV 
gamma interactions was collected from Cs-137. The rate of 
events in the detector was 30k/s. The rate of background fast 
neutrons in our detector is approximately less than one per 
second, so the contamination rate of fast neutrons in this 
gamma dataset of a few seconds can be estimated informally 
as fewer than 10 fast neutrons per 200,000 gamma pulses. 
Pulses were synthesized as follows: 
1. An 80 keVee threshold, significantly higher than the 
original near-noise trigger threshold, is selected. 
2. An event is drawn from the low threshold Cs-137 dataset. 
If it is greater than the threshold, it is kept as the trigger 
pulse. 
3. If it is kept, a second event is drawn. 
4. The second event is baseline-subtracted. 
5. If the second event is less than the threshold, it is time-
shifted so that its peak lies anywhere in the window, 
positive or negative, and added to the trigger pulse. 
6. If the second event is greater than the threshold, it is time-
shifted a non-negative offset (including zero) and added 
to the trigger pulse.  
7. If the summed event has a calculated energy greater than 
a 100 keVee threshold, it is saved as a synthetic pileup in 
a dataset of synthesized piled-up Cs-137 pulses. 
Step 6 takes care of the case where a negative time-offset of a 
pulse above the threshold would not simulate a real pile-up 
case, because the leading pulse would cause a trigger for itself 
instead of for the trailing pulse. This set of synthetic data 
provides us with a set of pulses known to be piled-up gamma 
pulses with known offsets. Approximately 1 million pileup  
Cs-137 pulses were synthesized that way. Using the GMM 
trained on the Cf-252 dataset, the two S-scores are computed 
for each of these synthetic pileup pulses.  
4.3 Supervised benchmarks 
For this and previous papers, the authors’ practical application 
required ruling out supervised training; however, we can 
implement supervised training to characterize the limits to 
performance imposed by the overlap of GMM scores between 
neutrons and pileups. Supervised learning requires a labeled 
dataset. The instances labeled as neutrons come from the  
Cf-252 data while the instances labeled as non-neutrons come 
from the synthetic pileup data. Training and test are applied 
only to the subset of these two datasets for which LLR > 0. 
The features consist of the neutron and gamma S-scores 
calculated using GMM on Cf-252 data. For some approaches 
we used the energy as a third feature. We used MATLAB 
Classification Learner App to train various classifiers and 
applied these classifiers to all the data to create ROC curves. 
We selected a range of supervised approaches including tree, 
several KNNs, ensemble, etc. The KNNs were built for three 
cases: K = 1, 10, and 100 nearest neighbors. Both two (S-
scores) and three (S-scores plus energy) features were 
considered for various classifiers with 5-fold cross-validation.  
4.4 Performance testing using ROC curves 
We computed ROC curves for all approaches. We also 
selected the area under the curve (AUC) as a single summary 
statistic to compare overall performance of all the approaches. 
AUC essentially provides the probability that a classifier will 
rank a randomly chosen neutron (positive) instance higher than 
a randomly chosen pileup (negative) instance. Figure 4 shows 
the ROC curves for the best of the supervised methods and the 
anomaly-rejector scores described in Sections 3.2.3 and 3.2.4. 
Table 1 shows the AUC for all the approaches. KNN for K = 
100 using three features gives the best performance. The 
overall unsupervised performance is the convex hull of the two 
ROC curves using thresholds on the sum of likelihood and the 
G parameter, respectively, as any point on the line segment 
between two prediction results can be achieved through the 
randomization technique [15]. One randomly uses one or the 
other system with probabilities proportional to the relative 
length of the opposite component of the segment. The 
unsupervised scores compare well to the supervised 
approaches using two features. Improvements in the KNN 
ROC curve by using energy as a third feature, denoted as 
“KNN3”, suggests that much can be gained, except for cases 
of very stringent pileup rejection, not only if the training is 
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supervised (using a cut on LLR > 0 and by building synthetic 
pileups) but also if energy is used as an additional feature.  
 
Figure 4. ROC curves for the sum of likelihoods (SumL 
black), G (red), KNN (blue) and KNN3 (green) scores. SumL 
and the G parameter are both derived from the two-component 
Gaussian mixture model of neutrons and gammas. The two K-
nearest-neighbor methods require labeled data for supervised 
training, KNN3 uses energy as a feature in addition to the S-
scores. “True positives” are neutrons with a positive LLR 
derived from a gamma-neutron GMM, and “false positives” 
are LLR > 0 synthetic pileups misidentified as neutrons. 
Neutrons are from Cf-252 generating > 100 keVee of light 
output. SumL is a good score for the low pileup scenarios, 
eliminating 90% of neutron-like pileup with only a few percent 
efficiency loss. The G score provides better performance when 
pileup needs to be reduced by more than two orders of 
magnitude. Scoring based on supervised machine learning 
methods, such as KNN, show the potential for even greater 
performance, and KNN3 shows the performance gains from 
including energy dependence. However, the performance 
gains are small in comparison to the analytical G score for the 
highest pileup rejection (lowest false positive rates) scenarios. 
The G score thresholds are notated at six points along the 
curve. Full-color version available on-line. 
4.5 Performance testing using Precision-Recall curves 
For many practical applications, the neutrons may be 
overwhelmed by non-neutron particles. In these cases, a small 
fraction of non-neutrons misidentified as neutrons (low FPR) 
may be the majority of events classified as neutrons, and a 
precision-recall curve (P-R) is more directly informative than 
an ROC (If the population ratio between classes is known,  
P-R can be computed from a ROC: recall is the TPR, and 
precision is a function of TPR, FPR, and the population ratio). 
A P-R curve calls attention to the question of how much the 
pulses classified as neutrons are diluted by non-neutrons. In 
this application, the precision-recall curve may be thought of 
as a trade between “neutron purity” and “neutron retention”.  
 
 
Table 1 
Comparison of performance of ten supervised and two 
unsupervised classification methods. The figure of merit is the 
area under the ROC curve, AUC. The supervised classifiers 
are three K nearest-neighbor models with different values of 
K, a tree, and boosted trees. Each supervised classifier was 
trained with neutron and pileup labeled data, using as input 
features just the two parameters from the neutron-gamma 
GMM, and also the two GMM features plus the energy. 
AUC 
 (E,Dn,Dg) (Dn,Dg) 
SumL  n/a .98 
G  n/a .94 
KNN K = 1 .98 .91 
K = 10 .99 .98 
K = 100 1.0 (KNN3 in 
Figures) 
.99 (KNN in 
Figures) 
Tree max splits 
= 100 
.99 .98 
Ensemble Boosted 
trees 
1.0 .98 
 
As with the ROC curves, we performed P-R on events in the 
LLR > 0 region. Precision depends on the ratio of neutrons 
versus everything else. Figure 3 shows that ignoring direct 
single gamma pulse misidentification is sufficient for our case, 
but handling cases where this approximation is not true may 
be accomplished by using a large sample of low rate data to 
estimate the single gamma pulse misidentification 
contribution. Figure 5 shows P-R for relative amounts of 25 
Cs-137 pileups per Cf-252 neutron. As shown in the title of the 
plot, 25 pileups per neutron amounts to a Cs-137 rate of  
10 kHz and neutron rate of 2.2 Hz, or a Cs-137 rate of 100 kHz 
and a neutron rate of 220 Hz; note the nonlinear scaling. Under 
these conditions, the unsupervised parameter G can be used to 
provide nearly 100% pure neutrons with an efficiency of 60% 
of all neutrons, while the sum of likelihoods can be used to 
provide nearly 100% neutron efficiency with 60% pure 
neutrons. 
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Figure 5. Precision-recall curves for neutrons from Cf-252 for 
the SumL (black), G (red), KNN (blue) and KNN3 (green) 
scores. Assumes misidentification is due only to Cs-137 pileup 
for scenarios with 25 pulse pileups per detected neutron (i.e. 
creating > 100 keVee of light output). SumL is a good score if 
efficiency above 80% is required. The G score provides better 
performance when high purity is needed at the cost of at least 
30% signal loss. Scoring based on supervised machine 
learning methods, such as KNN, show the potential for even 
greater performance, and KNN3 shows the performance gains 
from including energy dependence. However, the performance 
gains are small in comparison to the analytical G score for the 
highest purity scenarios. The G score thresholds are notated at 
eight points along the curve. Full-color version available on-
line. 
5. Discussions and Conclusions 
This work describes a way of taking advantage of a two-
component GMM to build an anomaly rejector. In this study, 
anomaly rejectors are designed and applied specifically to 
gamma-neutron pulse shape discriminating scintillators. For 
this problem, piled-up pulses contaminate the LLR-
discriminated neutron component of the GMM, while at the 
same time they do not make up a well-constrained cluster in 
feature space. Statistical rigor provides one solution, the sum 
of likelihoods, and the specific PSD situation constrains the 
distributions of anomalies well enough to provide another 
practical unsupervised solution via the G score. The G score is 
particularly valuable for situations requiring several orders of 
magnitude of pileup rejection. 
Operationally, the method leaves the user with three kinds of 
events: neutrons, LLR > 0 anomalies consisting of pileups and 
low-signal-to-noise neutrons, and LLR < 0 non-neutrons that 
are almost entirely gammas and piled-up gammas. The losses 
of neutrons in the overlap region and at LLR < 0 are folded 
into the efficiency of the system. In cases where either high 
gamma background or pileup is a problem, this method of 
rejecting anomalies both improves the efficiency by separating 
neutrons from other particles, and reduces the problems 
associated with including non-neutrons as neutrons in the 
analysis of data. For example, the analytical G score improves 
the presented scenario, over using only the LLR cut, from 16% 
neutron purity to nearly 99.9% while incurring a 60% loss over 
the baseline neutron detection efficiency. Comparatively, a 
direct reduction of detector size to 60% lower efficiency would 
increase the purity to approximately only 32%. We expect 
many applications dependent on fast neutron measurements, 
such as active interrogation and neutron multiplicity counting 
will benefit from the application of these techniques.  
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